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Creditor Seto:ffs in Bankruptcy Reorganizations: An Analysis
of Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc.
In an action between a debtor and a creditor, the debtor may
seek to reduce his liability by pleading counterclaims. A permissive
counterclaim-any claim against the creditor not arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the creditor's
claim1-is typically termed a "setoff" to the extent that it does not

I. "A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party
not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim." FED. R. CIV, P. ll!(b).
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involve affirmative relief.2 If the debtor is insolvent3 and seeks bankruptcy relief,4 setoffs may result in priorities whereby one creditor
gains preference in the distribution of the debtor's estate over other
creditors of the same class or even of a superior class.5 For example,
if Jones and Smith are each owed 1000 dollars by the bankrupt
Widget Corporation, which has assets of 1000 dollars, they normally
would expect to receive 500 dollars each.6 However, if Jones also
owes Widget 1000 dollars (Widget's sole asset is thus Jones's obligation), and Jones sets off Widget's claim against him with his claim
against Widget, then Smith will suffer a 1000 dollar loss and Jones
will be whole.7
2. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1538 (4th ed. 1951). See generally 3 J. MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1J 13.01-.41 (2d ed. 1974).
3. "A person shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this Act whenever the aggregate of his property • • • shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in
amount to pay bis debts." Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970). One need
not be insolvent to be entitled to the benefits of the Bankruptcy Act as a voluntary
bankrupt. Bankruptcy Act § 4(a), 11 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1970).
4. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, gives Congress the power "[t]o establish ••• uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." As James Madison argued: "The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately
connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where
the parties or their property may be removed into different states, that the expediency
of it seems not likely to be drawn into question." THE FEDERALisr No. 42, at 279 (P. Ford
ed. 1898). See generally 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,i 0.01-.10 (14th ed. J. Moore 1974)
[hereinafter COLLIER].
5. In "straight" bankruptcy proceedings, Bankruptcy Act §§ 1-74, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112 (1970), only unsecured creditors are expressly affected by the Bankruptcy Act.
Bankruptcy Act §§ 1(11), 63, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(11), 103 (1970). The Act sets out six
classes of claims in a descending order of priority. Bankruptcy Act §§ 64, 65; 11 ,
U.S.C. §§ 104, 105 (1970). Creditors in each class must receive full payment on their
claims before creditors in a lower class may share in the bankrupt's assets. See, e.g.,
In re Penticoff, 36 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Minn. 1941); In re Brannon, 53 F.2d 401, 402-03
(N.D. Tex. 1931). All creditors in the same class share pro rata if there are insufficient
funds in the bankrupt's estate to satisfy them all in full. In re Delaware Hosiery Mills,
202 F.2d 951, 953 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v. Killoren, 119 F.2d 364, 366 (8th
Cir. 1941); In re Columbia Ribbon Co., 117 F.2d 999, 1001-02 (3d Cir. 1941). In reorganization proceedings, Bankruptcy Act §§ 77, 101-276, 301-99, 11 U.S.C. §§ 205, 501676, 701-99 (1970), the problem is more complicated; the judge generally establishes
classes by reference to the legal character and effect of the creditor's claims. A class
may be further subdivided for voting purposes. Bankruptcy Act§§ 115, 197, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 515, 597 (1970). See In re Sixty-Seven Wall St. Restaurant Corp., 23 F. Supp. 672
(S.D.N.Y. 1938).
6. The text assumes that Jones and Smith are members of the same creditor class
and that no other creditors exist who are members of a superior or equal class. See
generally 6A COLLIER, supra note 4, ,i 9.10. The priority afforded by the setoff right
may even be superior to the priority of secured creditors in certain instances, however.
For example, if the security interest is in accounts receivable, the unsecured creditor
who is allowed a setoff will diminish the receivables, thus taking ahead of the secured
creditor.
7. It is often argued that such a setoff constitutes a voidable preference under
section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970). See 4 COLLIER, supra note 4,
,i 68.02, at 853 n.19. However, if at the time of the transaction the creditor does not
have reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent, section 60 will not apply.

934

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 73:932

Setoffs are expressly permitted by section 68 of the Bankruptcy
Act in straight bankruptcy proceedings.8 However, there is no corresponding section permitting setoffs under the reorganization provisions-section 77, and chapters X, XI, XII, and XIII. Prior to 1974,
the use of setoffs in bankruptcy reorganizations was governed by the
Supreme Court's dictum in Lowden v. Northwestern National Bank
& Trust Co. 9 The Supreme Court, dealing with a case involving a
section 77 railroad reorganization, stated that " ... § 68 of the statute
does not control the disposition of the controversy ex proprio vigore.
It governs, if at all, by indirection and analogy according to the
circumstances."10 Lowden was generally understood as allowing bankruptcy courts to permit setoffs in reorganizations if warranted by the
equities of the situation.11 One court listed the crucial factors as the
value of the assets involved, the temporary or permanent duration of
the debtor's inability to pay its debts as they mature, the existence
of superior liens, and the existence of an understanding between the
debtor and creditor that amounts owed by the creditor to the debtor
were to be used to cancel the debtor's obligation.12 In 1974, however,
the Supreme Court decided Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 18 which
significantly limited bankruptcy courts' discretion to permit setoffs
in section 77 railroad reorganization proceedings. This note will examine the Baker decision and consider its significance with respect to
Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt &: Co,, 237 U.S. 447 (1915): In re Pottier &:
Stymus Co., 262 F. 955 (2d Cir. 1919). Cf. Crisick v. Second Natl. Banlc, 115 F.2d 150
(D.C. Cir. 1940).
8, "In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bank, rupt and a creditor the account shall be stated and one debt shall be set off against
the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid." Bankruptcy Act § 68a,
11 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1970).
Straight banlcruptcy proceedings contemplate a liquidation of the debtor's estate.
In contrast, reorganization proceedings contemplate a continuation of the bankrupt
enterprise pursuant to an extension or partial forgiveness of the bankrupt's debts,
9. 298 U.S. 160 (1936). The case involved instructions requested by the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upon certified facts. 298 U.S. at 161. The first question presented to the Supreme Court was "Does the right of set-off recognized by
section 68(a) of the Bankruptcy Act apply to reorganization proceedings under section 77 of that act?" 298 U.S. at 162. Asserting that the question was "too general
and abstract, its relation to the controversy being indirect and problematical," the
Court refused to resolve the issue. 298 U.S. at 163. Because the remaining questions
were dependent on a resolution of the first, the Court dismissed the certificate, 298
U.S. at 166.
10. 298 U.S. at 164.
11. See, e.g., Tyler v. Marine Midland Trust, 128 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir. 1942):
In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 790, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); In re Susquehanna
Chem. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1, 6 (W.D. Pa.), affd., 174 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1949); In re
American Coils Co., 74 F. Supp. 723, 725 (D.N.J. 1947), revd. on other grounds, 187
F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1951).
12. In re Susquehanna Chem. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1, 6 (W.D. Pa.), affd., 174 F.2d
783 (3d Cir. 1949).
13. 417 U.S. 467 (1974).
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setoffs under section 77. The focus will be on two issues: the doctrinal
and policy justifications for the Baker rule and the impact of Baker
on the summary exclusive jurisdiction of a reorganization court to
enter an order barring setoffs in related proceedings. The note will
then assess the extent to which Baker should govern the treatment of
setoffs in Chapter X and XI reorganization proceedings.14
In Baker, the reorganization trustees15 of the Penn Central Railroad instituted an ancillary suit16 against Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., to
recover $6,999.76 in unpaid freight charges.17 Gold Seal counterclaimed, asking $18,016.77 for loss and damage to its shipments in
Penn Central's care. The district court granted the trustee's motion
for summary judgment but allowed a setoff on the basis of the
counterclaim, resulting in a net judgment of $11,017.01 for Gold
Seal.1 8 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
judgment; the Supreme Court reversed on writ of certiorari. Justice
Douglas, ·writing for the majority, noted that typically a court has
jurisdiction to entertain counterclaims in its final resolution of a
conflict, and that, in some instances, the counterclaims may be compulsory.19 However, he found railroad reorganization proceedings to
14. Chapter X is essentially concerned with the reorganization of large, publicly
held corporations with complicated debt structures. See text at notes 84-86 infra.
Chapter XI reorganization provisions may be utilized by any "person,'' including
corporations, and are derived from the common law of composition. See text at notes
93-99 infra.
15. The court must appoint a trustee or trustees in a section 77 proceeding upon
approval of the debtor's petition. Bankruptcy Act § 77(c)(l), 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(l)
(1970). Trustees must be appointed in chapter X reorganizations if the indebtedness
of the debtor exceeds $250,000, and may be appointed if the indebtedness is under
$250,000. Bankruptcy Act § 156, 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1970). Trustees are charged with the
duty of preserving the assets of the debtor for the benefit of all parties in interest.
Bankruptcy Act § 47, 11 U.S.C. § 75 (1970).
16. The courts of the United States hereinbefore defined as courts of bankruptcy
• • • are hereby invested • • • with • • • jurisdiction • • • to(20) Exercise ancillary jurisdiction over persons or property within their respective territorial limits in aid of a receiver or trustee appointed in any bankruptcy
proceedings pending in any other court of bankruptcy: Provided, however, that
the jurisdiction of the ancillary court over a bankrupt's property which it takes
into its custody shall not extend beyond preserving such property and, where
necessary, conducting the business of the bankrupt, and reducing the property to
money, paying therefrom such liens as the court shall find valid and the expenses
of ancillary administration, and transmitting the property or its proceeds to the
court of primary jurisdiction • • • •
11 U.S.C. § ll(a) (1970). Ancillary suits are independent proceedings brought in courts
other than the bankruptcy court in which the petition was filed. Ancillary proceedings
generally are brought in aid of the bankruptcy court of primary jurisdiction when
jurisdiction is not obtainable in that court. See l COLLIER, supra note 4, ,i 2.74.
Questions pertaining to the general administration of the debtor's estate may not be
entertained in an ancillary court. Lazarus v. Prentice, 234 U.S. 263 (1914).
17. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 484 F.2d 950, 951 (7th Cir. 1973), revd., 417
U.S. 467 (1974).
18. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 484 F.2d 950, 951 (7th Cir. 1973), revd., 417
U.S. 467 (1974). The district court opinion was not reported.
19. 417 U.S. at 468-69.
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be an exceptional class of cases, in which counterclaims that result
in setoffs are inappropriate. The majority acknowledged that section
68 expressly allows setoffs in straight bankruptcy proceedings,20 but
it refused to incorporate by analogy the policy judgment embodied
in that section into the section 77 railroad reorganization provisions.
Two rationales were advanced to support the distinction. First, the
Court stated that reorganization bankruptcies have a different ultimate objective than straight bankruptcies, and that to permit setoffs
would frustrate that objective: "The problem of the bankruptcy
Reorganization Court is somewhat different than the problem of the
straight bankruptcy court. Liquidation is not the objective. Rather,
the aim is by financial restructuring to put back into operation a
going concem."21 Since the collection of amounts owed the bankrupt
is necessary to keep its cash inflow sufficient for operating purposes,
and because to allow setoffs could significantly reduce that cash inflow, the court felt that setoffs violated the basic statutory purpose of
reorganization proceedings.22 The Court buttressed its conclusion
by noting that the preservation of an ongoing railroad was "in the
public interest,"23 and implied that the allowance of setoffs could
jeopardize that interest.
Second, the majority sought to distinguish straight bankruptcies
from railroad reorganization proceedings on the basis of the language
of section 77(e): "[T]he Reorganization Court shall approve a plan
if it 'is fair and equitable, affords due recognition to the rights of
each class of creditors and stockholders, and will conform to the
requirements of the law of the land regarding the participation of
the various classes of creditors and stockholders.' " 24 Recognizing that
setoffs are in effect priorities, allowing a member of a subordinate
creditor class to collect on his debt ahead of a member of the same
20. 417 U.S. at 468-69. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
21. 417 U.S. at 470.
22. The Penn Central in fact faced a severe liquidity problem. See N.Y. Times,
Dec. 21, 1974, at 37, col. 7 (late city ed.) (Penn Central faces cash shortage of $85.4
million for operations by end of February 1975); id., Dec. 4, 1974, at 63, col. 1 (late
city ed.) (Penn Central suffered $130.2 million operating loss in first 10 months of
1974). Liquidity is essential to the continued operation of a debtor in reorganization.
Without liquid capital the debtor could not meet its short-term obligations, such as
wages, and would collapse without having had the opportunity to resolve its longrange problems•.
23. 417 U.S. at 471. The overriding public interest in railroad reorganizations is
the maintenance of a viable national railroad system. In re Denver &: R.G.'\\T. R.R.,
38 F. Supp. 106, 115 (D. Cal. 1940). See generally Swaine, Present Status of Railroad
Reorganizations and Legislation Affecting Them, 18 N.Y.U. L.Q. 161 (1941). See also
Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448 (1943); :Bankruptcy Act § 77(d), 11 U.S.C.
§ 205(d) (1970), requiring the Interstate Commerce Commission to certify that a railroad reorganization plan "will be compatible with the public interest" before the
plan may be implemented.
24. 417 U.S. at 473, quoting :Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C. § 205(e)(l) {1970),
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or a superior class,25 the Court found that setoffs were inconsistent
with the "fair and equitable" standard enunciated in the statute:
"The allowance or disallowance of setoff may seem but a minor part
of the architectural problem. But to the extent that it is allowed, it
grants a preference to the claim of one creditor over the others by
the happenstance that it owes freight charges that the others do not.
That is a form of discrimination to which the policy of § 77 is
opposed. As a general rule of administration for § 77 Reorganization
Courts, the setoff should not be allowed."26 In promulgating this
"general rule," the Court departed from the position taken by most
lower courts and commentators, who cited Lowden and maintained
that bankruptcy courts could, in their assessment of the equities of
individual cases, decide to apply section 68 setoff principles to
reorganizations.21
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Powell,
sought to maintain the lower court interpretation of Lowden by
resting the decision in Baker on an alternate theory.28 Significantly,
the concurring Justices perceived the majority's holding as a shift in
the law: "By announcing a doctrine barring judicial setoffs as a
'general rule' the Court in the present case adopts a rationale inconsistent with Lowden, which quite clearly envisioned a case-by-case
analysis of the propriety of each attempted setoff in the light of equitable considerations."29
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, also argued that the majority view
was a departure from Lowden: 30 "Nothing could be more inconsistent ·with Lowden than the flat order of the Reorganization Court,
entered at the commencement of the reorganization proceedings, to
the effect that no setoffs were to be allowed, unless it be that part
of the Court's opinion in this case stating that '[a]s a general rule of
25. 417 U.S. at 473. See text at,notes 5-7 supra.
26. 417 U.S. at 474.
27. "Since § 68 does not create any new right but merely recognizes the doctrine
of set-off as authorized by legal and equitable principles and provides a means for
enforcement in bankruptcy, there would not seem to be any potent reason why § 68
should not apply in Chapter X reorganizations. The decisions, under ••• Chapter X,
as well as ••• Chapters XI and XII, have, without authoritative dissent, regarded
§ 68 as fully applicable in the respective proceedings involved." 6A COLLIER, supra
note 4, ,r 9.09, at 307-08. See also In re Cuyabogha Fin. Co., 136 F.2d 18 (6th Cir.
1943) (ch. X); In re Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 103 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1939) (ch. X);
In re Bush Terminal Co., 93 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1938) (ch. X); Lowden v. Iowa Des
Moines Natl. Bank 8: Trust Co., IO F. Supp. 430 (D.C. Iowa 1935), afjd., 84 F.2d 856
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 584 (1936).
28, Justice Stewart would have decided the case on jurisdictional grounds. See
text at notes 69-71 infra.
29. 417 U.S. at 476.
30. Justice Rehnquist also relied heavily on section 77(1) of the Bankruptcy Act,
11 U.S.C. § 205(1) (1970). See note 50 infra and accompanying text.
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administration for § 77 Reorganization Courts, the setoff should not
be allowed.' " 31
The majority responded summarily that "Lowden v. Northwestern National Bank &- Trust Co . .. is not to the contrary."82
Nevertheless, it felt compelled to state that "[m]uch law has been
fashioned in the reorganization field since 1936, the date of that
decision. The contours of plans have emerged which have given new
meaning and insight into the statutory words 'fair and equitable.' " 38
It is puzzling that the majority refused to take the final step of overruling its dictum in Lowden. Perhaps the Court simply felt that, as
dictum, Lowden could be overruled without so stating explicitly.
However, this would be an unlikely way to deal with a dictum that
has guided lower courts for thirty years.84 The Court's opinion more
likely should be read as indicating that the core principle of the
Lowden dictum-that there is no hard and fast rule as to the allowance of setoffs-is not rejected. Rather, the Court sought only to
limit the current scope of the Lowden dictum. By phrasing its result
as a "general rule,'' 35 and suggesting that no "exceptional circumstances" could justify the setoff in Baker,86 the Court implied that
setoffs would be allowed in section 77 reorganizations in certain
situations. Instead of presuming that the policy of section 68 could
be applied to railroad reorganizations, the Court, as a consequence
of new insights into the meaning of the "fair and equitable" language
in section 77(e), created a strong presumption against the allowance
of setoffs. Thus, the opinion shifts the burden of justifying the setoff
to the counterclaiming creditor.
The operation of the Baker rule is to some extent unclear. On
the one hand, certain tests previously employed to determine whether
to allow setoffs under Lowden will no longer be dispositive. For
example, the precedential value of a line of post-Lowden cases that
allowed setoffs when an understanding was reached by the parties
that the debtor's deposits with the creditor were to be used to cancel
the debtor's obligations37 is now dubious. Under Baker such understandings may not provide the creditor who is a party to the understanding with a right to share in the debtor's assets that outweighs
the rights of other similarly classified or superior creditors; such dis31. 417 U.S. at 482, quoting the majority opinion, 417 U.S. at 474 (emphasis orig•
inal).
32. 417 U.S. at 474 n.13.
33. 417 U.S. at 474 n.13.
34. 417 U.S. at 475-76 n.2 (Stewart, J., co~cuning).
35. 417 U.S. at 474.
36. 417 U.S. at 474 n.13.
37. See, e.g., Tyler v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 128 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1942). See also
Susquehanna Chem. Corp. v. Producers Bank&: Trust Co., 174 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir.
1949): text at note 12 supra.
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parate treatment would run afoul of the Court's interpretation of the
"fair and equitable" language of section 77(e). On the other hand,
although the exceptions to the Baker rule were not defined, situations
of extreme inequity can be hypothesized that may justify allowance
of setoffs. For example, the "unclean hands" of a creditor have been
held to justify subordinating his claim to the claims of other creditors
in the same class.38 Thus, if Jones and Smith are the only creditors
of the Widget Railroad, which is being reorganized under section 77,
and if Jones has caused the bankruptcy through fraudulent misdealings with Widget, the courts may still allow Smith to set off Widget's
claim against him with his claim against Widget, thus subordinating
Jones' claim.
Even if the exact dimensions of the Baker holding are uncertain,
it is clear that fewer setoffs will be allowed under Baker than were
allowed under Lowden. Both of the rationales advanced to support
this shift in judicial attitude are open to question. Justice Douglas'
first argument was based on the protection of the debtor's cash inflow.80 Liberal allowance of setoffs would permit creditors to reduce
their payments to the debtor by the amount of the outstanding debts
owed them, perhaps slowing incoming cash payments to such an
extent that the railroad would be unable to meet its expenses. But,
although the Baker rule does protect cash inflow from setoffs,
it goes too far, and unnecessarily rigidifies a reorganization court's
ability to seek an equitable solution . to the problems of counterclaiming creditors. There are several mt;ans of achieving the ultimate
objective of a railroad reorganization-revitalization of an ongoing
rail line-without completely eliminating the priority of setoffs. For
example, the bankruptcy courts could postpone and preserve setoff
priorities until the corporation has restabilized its position.40 The
objectives of the act would be satisfied and the congressional policy
behind section 68 of recognizing a priority for setoffs in straight
bankruptcies would be respected in section 77 proceedings. Also, the
amount of the setoff in some cases may be insignificant in relation
to the debtor's cash flow. Disallowing setoffs in such cases obviously
cannot be justified by the need to protect the debtor's liquidity.
38. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305-06 (1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas &
Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). Taylor established the "Deep ·Rocle Doctrine." The
Court subordinated the claims of Standard Gas to those of other creditors against its
subsidiary, Deep Rocle Oil Co., on a showing that Standard had launched Deep Rocle
as an undercapitalized entity and had thereafter mismanaged the company for its own
benefit.
39. See note 22 supra and accompanying t!!){t.
40. This would be consistent with the view that a bankruptcy court's power to
affect the rights of creditors is limited to such measures as are, given the circumstances, least prejudicial to those rights. In line with this view, reorganization plans
that have not yet been confirmed by the reorganization court have been characterized
as "little more than a provisional sequestration to give protection for the future."
Lowden v. Northwestern Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160, 164 (1936).
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Perhaps the rigidity of the Baker rule may be attributable to concern
for administrative convenience,41 equity,42 or a fear that the lower
courts will abuse their discretion.43 These considerations were not
mentioned in the Baker opinion, however, and their significance is
speculative at best.
The second rationale advanced by Justice Douglas to justify the
Baker rule-the "fair and equitable" requirement of section 77(e)44
-is not independently determinative. As Justice Rehnquist pointed
out in dissent, the allowance of a setoff in section 77 reorganizations
is no more inequitable than the allowance of setoffs in straight bankruptcy proceedings: "[I]t seems a sufficient answer to the Court's observation that the allowance of a setoff grants a preference .•. to say
that the Bankruptcy Act's strictures against preferences apply with
as much force to ordinary bankruptcies as to reorganizations, and
yet § 68 of the Act specifically allows this type of 'preference' in an
ordinary bankruptcy proceeding."45 Justice Rehnquist's position is
sound, but it deserves a more thorough elucidation.
Although the straight bankruptcy provisions contain no explicit
requirement that treatment of creditors be "fair and equitable," the
bankruptcy court operates as a court of equity, under express statutory directives that for the most part give secured creditors priority
over unsecured creditors46 and treat similarly situated unsecured
creditors equally.47 The ~•fair and equitable" requirement in section
77 has been defined in analogous terms: "There is a hierarchy of
claims, the owner of the equity coming last. Wages owing workers
running the trains have a high current priority. Secured creditors
have by law a priority in the hierarchy. Unsecured creditors usually
are pooled together. They may receive new securities, perhaps
stock."48 Thus, the general policy considerations behind the "fair
41. See text at note 53 infra.
42. For example, equity may require that size of the creditor's claim not be con•
sidered: "Ordinarily, a creditor is not entitled to better treatment merely because he
holds a small claim rather than a large one." In re Hudson-Ross, Inc., 175 F. Supp.
111 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
43. Cf. 6A COLLIER, supra note 4, ,r 9.09 (favoring a narrow· construction of Lowden
to limit court discretion).
44. See text at notes 24-27 supra.
45. 417 U.S. at 482.
46. Bankruptcy Act §§ 1(11), 63, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(11), 103 (1970). The secured creditor who retains his security will not be allowed to participate in the distribution
of the bankrupt debtor's estate unless the debt exceeds his security. The partially
secured creditor will receive a credit to the extent that the security covers the debt,
and dividends will be paid on the amount owed by the debtor that exceeds the
credit. Bankruptcy Act §§ 57(b), (e), 11 U.S.C. §§ 93(b), (e) (1970).
47. "[E]quality is equity, and this is the spirit of the bankrupt law." Cunningham
v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 13 (1924).
48. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 473 (1974).
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and equitable" language are, for the most part, reflected in the application of the straight bankruptcy provisions.
Section 68, which allows setoffs in straight bankruptcy proceedings, is an explicit exception to these creditor treatment policies and
is grounded in a congressional judgment about the equity of setoffs.49
Accordingly, the policy that creditors receive "fair and equitable"treatment is not independently a valid reason for refusing to allow
setoffs under section 77; Congress has decided that similar creditor
treatment policies under the straight bankruptcy provisions do not
exclude setoffs. As Justice Rehnquist noted, 50 this argument is par~
ticularly persuasive in light of section 77('t): "In proceedings under
this section and consistent with the provisions thereof, ... the duties
of the debtor and the rights and liabilities of creditors • . . shall be
the same as if a voluntary petition for adjudication had been filed
and a decree of adjudication had been entered on the day when the
debtor's petition was filed." 51 In other words, the provisions governing straight bankruptcy apply with equal force to reorganization
proceedings unless they are inconsistent with reorganization provisions. A justification other than the general rule on creditor class
treatment contained in the "fair and equitable" language of section
77(e) thus must be found to distinguish creditor treatment in straight
bankruptcies from creditor treatment in reorganization proceedings.
A possible argument against Justice Rehnquist's position rests
upon a technical construction of the "fair and equitable" language
discussed above. Many have interpreted the "fair and equitable"
language to lay down a rule of absolute priority: "As ... a term of
art, it requires that as between secured and unsecured creditors,. and
between unsecured creditors and stockholders, the priority of the
senior interest over the junior in the distribution of equities in the
corporate assets [be] absolute.''52 If the "fair and equitable" language
is construed as an indication of a legislative intent to exclude exceptions to the general hierarchical treatment of creditor classes under
section 77, then the section 68 policy with respect to setoffs should not
be carried over to section 77 proceedings.
The Baker rule does have several practical advantages. By disallowing setoffs in most cases, Baker may bring about a simplification
of railroad reorganization proceedings, and perhaps a consequent
49. Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt &: Co., 237 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1915). See
also Studley v. Boylston Natl. Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913); Prudential Ins. Co. of

America v. Nelson, 101 F.2d 441, 443 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 583 (1939).
50. "The language of subsection (l) of § 77, even more emphatically than .the
Lowden decision, would seem to unconditionally mandate the application of the rule
regarding setoffs contained in § 68 of the Bankruptcy Act to railroad reorganizations
such as this." 417 U.S. at 482.
51. Bankruptcy Act § 77(l), 11 U.S.C. § 205(l) (1970).
52. 9 CoLLIER, supra note 4, 11 9.18.
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reduction in cost.53 Presumably the difficult equitable question
whether to allow a setoff will arise less frequently because the credi..
tor seeking a setoff in the reorganization court will bear the heavy
burden of demonstrating "exceptional circumstances." In a_ddition,
the Baker rule is in accord with the common practice of reorganization courts to grant on a motion by the trustee a general injunction
restraining all creditors from seeking setoffs in ancillary suits. The
order is typically issued at the time the reorganization petition is
approved, and has become standard practice in reorganization proceedings.54
The Baker rule, however, may defeat the expectations of business
creditors who have extended credit on the basis of their counterbalancing obligation to the debtor.55 The typical case is that of the
:financing institution that extends unsecured credit in reliance on the
fact that the debtor maintains sums on deposit with the institution.
Under the Baker rule, the institution would be liable for the entire
amount of the bankrupt debtor's accounts; it would not be able to
set off those accounts against the sums owed to it by the debtor as a
result of the extension of credit. Undoubtedly, such institutions will
become more wary of extending unsecured credit in light of Baker. u0
One should also consider the domino effect that the Baker rule
may have on the stability of the national railroad system. Among a
railroad's largest creditors will be the other railroads with which the
debtor road has interlining agreements. 57 The more traffic two railroads shuttle between themselves, the more likely it is that large
overlapping debts and credits will accumulate. Prohibiting setoffs
-53. The administration of a debtor's estate is a very expensive process, See, e.g.,
Note, The Cost of Corporate Reorganization Under the Chandler Act, 52 HARV, L.
REv. 1349 (1939).
54. REPORT OF nm CO!liMISSION ON nm BANKRUPICY LAws OF 11IE UNITED STATES
§ 7-204, Note, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 238 (1973) [here•
inafter REPORT],
55. The banker's lien on deposits, the right of retention and set-off of mutual
debts, are frequently spoken of as though they were synonymous, while in strict•
ness, a set-off is a counterclaim which the defendant may interpose by way of
cross-action against the plaintiff. But, broadly speaking, 1t represents the right
which one party has against another to use his claim in full or partial satisfac•
tion of what he owes to the other. That right is constantly exercised by businessmen in making book entries whereby one mutual debt is applied against another.
Studley v. Boylston Natl. Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913).
56. Denying banks a right of setoff "would in many cases make banks hesitate to
honor checks given to tllird persons, would precipitate bankruptcy, and so interfere
witli tlie course- of business as to produce evils of serious and far-reaching consequence." Studley v. Boylston Natl. Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 529 (1913).
57. "There is no statutory compulsion for interconnecting rail carriers to utilize
any particular method of collecting fares and freight charges for a through-routed
shipment. But, as a practical matter, only one such method is feasible. That is for
a single carrier ••• to collect the entire fare, and then remit to the interline carriers
their pro rata portions." In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 486 F.2d 519, 531 (3d Cir,
1973) (Adanis, J., concurring}, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 990 (1974).
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by a creditor railroad may put a serious financial strain on that railroad; in effect it must at least for some time bear the cost of interlining the debtor's passengers and freight while paying for ·all of its
own traffic interlined by the debtor. Such a. situation may cause the
creditor also to seek reorganization or other bankruptcy relief.
Multiple or chain reorganizations may be the result. 58 ,
To some extent the dangers of the domino effect can be averted
because a reorganization plan under section 77 must be approved by
creditors of each voting class holding two thirds of the amount of
total claims of the class. 59 Although the bankruptcy court can confirm
a plan that has not been approved by each class if the plan is "fair
and equitable," 60 creditor approval is significant in the plan's formulation and in the judge's decision. 61 If a plan threatens to force
additional reorganizations, the creditors will balk at approving it.
Furthermore, the Interstate Commerce Commission has a veto power
over any railroad reorganization plan promulgated pursuant to _section 77,62 and it would act to protect the national railroad system.
Nevertheless, the Baker rule is unfortunate to the-extent that it forces
a choice bettveen risking a domino effect and preventing the debtor
line from reorganizing.
The Baker decision also raises questions about the extent of a
section 77 reorganization court's summary jurisdiction. Summary
procedures permit informal, abbreviated decision-making processes.
A plenary suit, on the other hand, is typically a regular civil action
with summons, formal pleadings, full trial, and possibly a jury. The
differences have been summarized as follows:
The main characteristic differences between a summary proceeding
and a plenary suit are: The former ·is based upori petition:, and
proceeds without formal pleadings; the latter proceeds upon formal
pleadings. In the former, the necessary parties are cited in by order
to show cause; in the latter, formal summons brings in the parties
other than the plaintiff. In the former, short time notice of hearing
58. At least one court has attempted to solve this problem by finding a "trust
relationship" between railroads; a reorganization railroad's debt to other railroads is
viewed as property of the creditor, held in trust by the debtor, and thus not susceptible to general pro rata distribution among creditors. See In re Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 486 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 990 (1974). Judge Adams, concurring in Penn Central, suggested that the treatment of interline freight and passenger accounts should be considered sui generis; interline railroads should be given
a preferred position in railroad reorganization proceedings with respect to owed
freight and passenger revenues. 486 F.2d at 533.
59. Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1970).
60. Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C. § 205(e} (1970).
61. If the plan is not approve~ by creditors holding two thirds in amount of the
total of the allowed claims of each class, the judge must make additional findings to
ascertain whether the rejection was reasonable. Bankruptcy Act § 77(e), 11 U.S.C.
§ 205(e) (1970).
62. Bankruptcy Act § 77(d), 11 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1970).
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is fixed by the court; in the latter, time for pleading and hearing is
fixed by statute or by rule of court. In the former, the hearing is
- quite ·generally upon affidavits; in the latter, examination of witnesses
is the usual method. In the former, the hearing is sometimes ex parte;
in the latter, a full hearing is had. 63

A section 77 reorganization court has the statutory jurisdiction summarily to issue orders concerning the administration of the debtor's
assets; 64 thus, summary jurisdiction may be exercised with respect
to such matters as the appointment of receivers and trustees and the
priority of creditors' claims. A reorganization court also may exercise
summary jurisdiction with respect to controversies that arise between
claimants and the debtor's trustee or receiver regarding property
claimed to be part of the debtor's estate, if the court has actual or
constructive possession of the property.65 If, on the other hand, the
controversy involves property in the actual or constructive possession
· of a third person asserting a bona fide adverse claim, the bankruptcy
court cannot summarily determine that person's claim upon a petition by the trustee unless the adverse claimant consents to the court's
jurisdiction.66 Without consent, the trustee must bring a plenary suit
in a court of appropriate jurisdiction.67
Baker was an appeal from a federal district court that had allowed
a setoff in contravention of a summary order previously issued by the
reorganization court.68 Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion,
argued that the summary jurisdiction of the reorganization court over
the debtor's property made the order binding upon all other courts,
and that no inquiry by the Supreme Court into the scope of the
63. Central Republic Bank &: Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F,2d 721, 731-32 (8th Cir.
1932).
64. Bankruptcy Act § 77(c), 11 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1970). See Lathrop v. Drake, 91
U.S. 516 (1875).
65. Bankruptcy Act § 77(a), 11 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1970) (reorganization court has
"exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property").
66. Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97, 99 (1944); Harrison v. Chamberlain, 271 U.S. 191,
193 (1926); Duda v. Sterling Mfg. Co., 178 F,2d 428, 433 (8th Cir. 1949). See generally
2 COLLIER, supra note 4, ,I 23.04-.07.
67. See Harris v. Avery Brundage Co., 305 U.S. 160, 164 (1938).
68. The trustees of Penn Central brought a plenary action in the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois to recover freight charges owed Penn Central
by Gold Seal. The Penn Central Railroad was concurrently undergoing reorganization
proceedings in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The reorganization court in Pennsylvania had issued an order which provided in part that
[a]ll persons, firms and corporations, holding collateral heretofore pledged b}'
the Debtor as security for its notes or obligations or holding for the account of
the Debtor deposit balances or credits be and each of them hereby [is] restrained
and enjoined from selling, converting or otherwise disposing of such collateral,
deposit balances or other credits, or any part thereof, or from offsetting the same,
or any part thereof, against any obligation of the Debtor, until further order of
this Court.
417 U.S. at 478 n.4.
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reorganization court's discretion to allow or disallow setoffs was
warranted:
Section 77a gives the Reorganization Court "exclusive jurisdiction
of the debtor and its property wherever located." ... It has been
commonly accepted in the federal courts that "property'' within the
meaning of this section includes intangibles such as choses in action. . . . It follows, therefore, that the respondent's debt to the
Penn Central fell ·within the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the Reorganization Court immediately upon the approval of the petition for
reorganization. While such jurisdiction may not empower the Reorganization Court to enforce the cause of action, ... it certainly does
empower the court to protect the "property'' and to immunize it from
diminution through setoff or counterclaim. To hold otherwise would
be inconsistent ·with the function of the Reorganization Court to
consolidate and protect the assets of the petitioning corporation.6 9

Because a reorganization court's summary power is exclusive, it must
be respected by all other courts and can be attacked only on direct
review. 70 Justice Stewart would thus have reversed the lower court in
Baker for not adhering to the general restraining order of the :reorganization court against creditor offsets. His position finds support
in recent federal case law dealing with the Penn Central reorganization.71
Justice Stewart's position assumes two subpropositions, both of
which have precedential support and flow logically from the congressional purposes underlying section 77's reorganization provisions.
First, Justice Stewart assumes (and the majority agreed72) that a chose
in action is property of the debtor, and thus subject to the jurisdiction
of the reorganization court.73 Justice Rehnquist, however, asserts in
his dissenting opinion that the claim that Gold Seal sought to set off
was not "property that was actually or constructively in the possession
of the trustees .... While the Reorganization Court undoubtedly had
plenary authority over the trustees, and over the 'property' of the
debtor, it certainly does not have such jurisdiction over whatever
funds of respondent might be used to satisfy a judgment against him
in favor of the trristees." 74 Justice Rehnquist's argument misses the
69. 417 U.S. at 476-77 (emphasis original).
70. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 483 (1940); Stout v. Green,
131 F.2d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 1942).
71. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 453 F.2d 520 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 923 (1972).
72. 417 U.S. at 472 n.7.
73. 417 U.S. at 476-77 (Stewart, J., concurring), dting 2 COLLIER, supra note 4,
,r 23.05[4], at 485. Debts owed a bankrupt commonly have been viewed as within the
constructive possession of the bankruptcy court, enabling the court summarily to
determine the rights of the various claimants. See, e.g., Lahey v. Trachman, 130 F.2d
748, 750 (2d Cir. 1942); In re Worrall, 79 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1935).
74. 417 U.S. at 480.
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distinction between the enforcement of a chose in action-which requires personal jurisdiction over the adverse party-and the preservation of a chose in action pursuant to the reorganization court's duty
to preserve the debtor's property. The reorganization court in Baker
was not enforcing the chose in action (the debt owed by the creditor
to the debtor); the trustee was enforcing the debt in a plenary suit in
a different court. The reorganization court, apparently having determined that setoffs against the debt were inappropriate in the case
before it,75 was merely protecting the chose in action wherever it was
enforced. Such protection is justifiable because a chose in action,
which may reflect an account receivable, for example, is a common
corporate asset that may be bought and sold in the same way as a
physical asset. It represents potential cash inflow, and an attempt to
revitalize a corporation by reorganization requires protection of the
corporation's cash flow as well as protection of its tangible assets. 70
Second, Justice Stewart assumes that the reorganization trustee
can institute a plenary suit against a creditor in a district court
and at the same time bring with him a reorganization court decree
that limits the district court's jurisdiction to allow creditor setoffs.
By so doing, the trustee seeks relief in the district court without
submitting himself to the full jurisdiction of that court, which
would include jurisdiction to allow counterclaims and setoffs.
'While this proposition runs contrary to the thrust of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 13(b), which explicitly allows the pleading of
permissive counterclaims, it has been recognized that bankruptcy
reorganizations are unlike other civil actions. 77 The goal of corporate revitalization is facilitated when the trustee is able to pursue his claims unhindered by the risk of potential asset depletions
75. See text at notes 80-83 infra.
76. See text at note 22 supra.
77. Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 470 (1974). See also Commonwealth v. Bartlett, 384 F.2d 819, 821 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968),
quoting Continental Ill. Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island Ry., 294
U.S. 648, 676 (1935):
The interest of the court in any reorganization is greater than • • • the pre•
vention of diminution of assets and the achievement of an equitable adjustment
among claimants. It has the further object of preserving the corporation as
a going concern. '[I']o prevent the attainment of that object is to defeat the very
end the accomplishment of which was the sole aim of the section, and thereby
to render its provisions futile.'
Cf. In re Penn Victor Dairies, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 126, 127 (E.D. Pa. 1935):
The inference is drawn that the court is without the judicial power to restrain
the landlord from resuming the possession of its property. The general principle
may be conceded. We have, however, another principle which is applicable, This
is that, the property and affairs of the debtor having been committed to the care
of the court, it cannot permit any interference with the performance of its duty.
Under section 77B [the predecessor of chapter X], a part of that duty is to
supervise and pass upon a plan of reorganization of the debtor so as to enable
it to continue its business under its own management. All rights to the assertion
of remedies against the debtor are necessarily suspended until one of the final
objectives of the section 77B proceeding has been reached.
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through setoffs that the reorganization court has already determined to be unwarranted. For example, when the creditor has possession of property claimed by the trustee as a part of the debtor's
estate, the problem of obtaining personal jurisdiction may require
that the trustee pursue his claim in an ancillary court of appropriate
jurisdiction.78 The debtor's estate may be reduced without justification if the ancillary court has the jurisdiction to set the trustee's right
to the property off against the claim of the creditor against the
debtor's estate, in violation of an order of a reorganization court.79
The majority opinion in Baker ignored the jurisdictional problem and considered the extent of a railroad reorganization court's
discretion to allow setoffs, announcing its general rule against allowance of setoffs. In one sense, the result is baffling. The Court, reviewing a district court decision that allowed a setoff in contravention of
a reorganization court decree, reversed the district court on the
ground that reorganization courts generally do not have the power
to allow setoffs, even though the reorganization court in Baker actually enjoined all setoffs. The result would make sense if the majority assumed without comment that the reorganization court actually
had not enjoined all setoffs, a matter Justice Stewart considered "not
wholly free from doubt." 80 However, the introductory language of
the majority opinion seemed to acknowledge the reorganization
court's prohibition of setoffs, 81 and the prohibition was recognized
as such by both the concurring82 and dissenting opinions.83 Strictly
speaking, then, the Court's treatment of the merits of the district
court's allowance of the setoff may imply that the district court had
some discretion not to heed the reorganization court's order. Such
a retreat from the exclusivity of a reorganization court's summary
jurisdiction would be surprising. The more logical explanation is
that Justice Douglas chose not to deal with the jurisdictional point
but rather to lay down a general rule for all courts about the propriety of setoffs in bankruptcy reorganizations. His failure to rest on
or even to mention the district court's violation of the reorganization
court's order was perhaps a technical flaw in the opinion, because it
78. See text at notes 66-67 supra. This assumes' that the property is not merely
a chose in action, such as a debt, which would be in the possession of the debtor
and thus within the jurisdiction of the reorganization court. Note, however, that the
reorganization court could still issue an order prohibiting a setoff against the creditor's claim, because technically the order would prohibit the setting off of the debtor's
right to the property-a chose of action within the court's jurisdiction-rather than
a setting off of the property itself.
79. See note 78 supra.
80. 417 U.S. at 477 (concurring opinion).
81. 417 U.S. at 468.
82. 417 U.S. at 477.
83. 417 U.S. at 482.
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could give rise to unwarranted implications, but it should not be
read as a harbinger of a major doctrinal shift.
The balance of this note discusses Baker's applicability to reorganizations other than section 77 railroad reorganizations. By analogy,
Baker may be extended at least to reorganizations under chapter X
of the Bankruptcy Act. 84 Chapter Xis a reorganization scheme generally designed for use by large corporate debtors with complex
financial problems. 85 It is an accommodation of the public's interest
in protecting stockholders and promoting the health of economically
significa.I!t enterprises and the private interests of the corporation's
creditors and management. 86
Chapter X, like section 77, requires that a reorganization court
find a proposed plan to be "fair and equitable" before it may be
confirmed.87 It is accepted doctrine that the meaning of the term
"fair and equitable" is the same in chapter X as in section 77.88
Thus, to the extent that the Court's decision in Baker rests on a
construction of the "fair and equitable" language of section 77, its
reasoning applies with equal force to reorganizations under chapter X.
The argument in Baker concerning the public's interest in revitalizing :financially insecure railroads89 and the consequent necessity to preserve cash inflow by limiting setoffs00 also extends to chapter
X. Chapter X reflects the strong national economic interest in the
revitalization of large corporate debtors. 91 Large corporations employ
many workers and are major suppliers and customers. In addition,
they support the general advance of technology. While the public
interest in revitalization of large corporations in general is perhaps
less specific than the public interest in revitalization of railroads, it
is still quite important.92 If the threat to the debtor's liquidity posed
84. 11 u.s.c. §§ 501-676 (1970).
85. See SEC v. American Trailer Rentals, 379 U.S. 594 (1965); General Stores Corp,
v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); SEC v. United States Realty &: Improvement Co., 310
U.S. 434 (1940).
86. See S. REP. No, 2073, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 6-9 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 3012, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936); Doub, Corporate Reorganizations Under Chapter X of the
National Bankruptcy Act, 3 MD. L. REv. 1 (1938); Wham, Some Recent Developments
in Corporation Reorganizations, 18 N.Y.U. L. REv. 352 (1941).
87. Bankruptcy Act § 221(2), 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1970).
88. Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78, 85
(1942); Consolidated Rocle Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941). Chapter X was
originally introduced in Congress at the same time as section 77, and denominated
section 77B. See w. MOORE, THE REORGANIZATION OF RAILROAD CORPORATIONS 18-19
(1941).
89. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
90. See text following note 39 supra.
91. S. REP. No. 2073, supra note 86, at 7; Wham, supra note 86, at 352-53, Sec
also Hearings on H.R. 6439 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, '75th Cong.,
1st Sess. 163-64 (1937) [hereinafter House Hearings].
92. But see In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 453 F.2d 520, 522 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972).

April 1975]

Notes

949

by the use of the setoff device cannot be tolerated (absent exceptional circumstances) in light of the purpose of section 77, then
setoffs also cannot be tolerated under chapter X in light of the importance of liquidity to the revitalization of the corporate debtor.
Whether Baker should apply to chapter XI· reorganizations is a
more complicated question. Chapter XI is rooted in the common la'\v
of composition and arrangement.93 It was enacted concurrently with
chapter X,94 and the two chapters were designed to be mutually
exclusive altematives.95 Chapter Xis the appropriate reorganization
vehicle when the debtor is large, when there is a complex capital
structure that needs adjustment, and when creditors are widespread
and as a practical matter unable to participate effectively.96 The
typical chapter XI debtor is likely to be smaller, or to have less complex financial problems.97 Moreover, the relief granted under chapter
XI is more limited than that granted under chapter X, 98 perhaps
taking the form of a simple extension or composition without extinguishment of any debts.99 The rights of secured creditors theoretically
93. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 605 (1965). See also, Bankruptcy Act § 306(1), 11 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970) (defining an arrangement as "any plan
of a debtor for the settlement, satisfaction, or e.xtension of the time of payment of
bis unsecured debts • • ••'').
94. Act of June 22, 1938, Pub. L. No. 696, 52 Stat. 905.
95. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 607 (1965).
96. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); General Stores Corp.
v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); SEC v. United States Realty &: Improvement Co., 310
U.S. 434 (1940).
97. Chapter XI is a statutory variation of the common-law composition of creditors and, unlike the broader scope of Chapter X, is limited to an adjustment
of unsecured debts. It was sponsored by the National Association of Credit Men
and other groups of creditors' representatives whose experience had been in representing trade creditors in small and middle-sized commercial failures. . • . The
contrast between the provisions of Chapter X, carefully designed to protect the
creditor and stockholder interests involved, and the summary provisions of Chapter XI is quite marked•.•• [T]he basic purpose of Chapter XI [is] to provide
a quick and economical means of facilitating simple compositions among general
creditors who have been deemed by Congress to need only the minimal disinterested protection provided by that Chapter.
SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 605-06 (1965).
98. In comparing chapter XI to chapter X, the Supreme Court noted:
The debtor generally remains in possession and operates the business under court
supervision, § 342. A trustee is only provided in the very limited situation where
a trustee in bankruptcy has previously been appoillted, § 332. There is no requirement for a receiver, but the Court "may" appoint one if it finds it to be
"necessary," § 332. The plan of arrangement is proposed by, and only by, the
debtor, §§ 306(1), 323, 357, and creditors have only the choice of accepting or
rejecting it. Acceptances may be solicited by the debtor even before filing of the
Chapter XI petition and, in fact, must be solicited before court review of the
plan, § 336(4). There are no provisions for an independent study by the court
or a trustee, or for advice by them being given to creditors in advance of the
acceptance of the arrangement. In short, Chapter XI provides a summary procedure whereby judicial confirmation is obtained on a plan that has been formul~t~d and accepted with only a bare minimum of independent control or superV1S1on.
SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 606 (1965).
99. Bankruptcy Act § 306(1), 11 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970).
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are unaffected by a chapter XI plan,100 although in practice such
creditors often are enjoined "from executing upon their security
interests.101
To the extent that Baker rested on an absolute priority doctrine
derived from the "fair and equitable" language of section 77,102 the
· case should not apply to reorganizations under chapter XI. There is
no requirement in chapter XI that a plan be "fair and equitable,"103
and Congress has required that creditors in a chapter XI arrangement
be given only minimal protection.104
The public interest rationale of the Baker decision also cannot be
carried over to chapter XI. Chapter XI is the product of lobbying
by trade creditors' associations that sought an alternative to the cumbersome provisions of chapter X.105 The interests it protects are those
of trade creditors; the court need not find the reorganization plan
to be in the public interest, but only that it is "for the best interests
of the creditors."106 This requirement is typically interpreted to mean
only that the plan would pay creditors more than they would receive
werethe debtor to liquidate in a straight bankruptcy proceeding.107
Thus, to the degree that Baker rests on the public interest in the
revitalization of railroads, it should not be applied by analogy to
chapter XI arrangements. The interests protected by chapter XI are
overwhelmingly private.
The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws has proposed a new chapter
VII, which consolidates present chapters X and XI into one reorgani100. Bankruptcy Act §§ 306(1), 307(1); 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(1), 707(1) (1970).
101. Secured creditors may be temporarily restrain~d from realizing on their collateral if such realization would defeat the chapter's rehabilitative purposes. In re
Land Foods, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
102. See text at note 52 supra.
103. "Fair and equitable" language originally was included in chapter XI, but it
was deleted in 1952 and replaced with the requirement that the plan be "for the
best interests of the creditors." Congress deemed this latter requirement to be sufficient protection in light of the general philosophy of Chapter XI to expedite "simple" compositions. See S. REP. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 20-21 (1952); H.R.
REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1952). The "fair and equitable" language
would have created difficulties when applied to a typical chapter XI situation involving an individual proprietorship, a partnership, or a closely held corporation in
which the owners are also the managers: "[I']he fair and equitable rule ••• cannot
realistically be applied in a Chapter XI, XII, or XIII proceeding. Were it so applied,
no individual debtor and, under Chapter XI, no corporate debtor where the stock
ownership is substantially identical with management could effectuate an arrange•
ment except by payment of the claims of all creditors in full." H.R. REP. No. 2320,
supra, at 21.
104. See notes 97-98 supra.
105. See House Hearings, supra note 91, at 31, 35; note 9'7 supra.
106: Bankruptcy Act § 366(2), 11 U.S.C. § 766(2) (1970).
107. See In re Village Men's Shops, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Ind. 1960); In re
Bruce Hunt of Albany Corp., 163 F. Supp. 939 (N.D.N.Y. 1958); 50 Am. Bankr. R. (n.s,)
465 (Ref. S.D. Ind. 1941).
.
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zation scheme.108 While the proposed Act specifically recognizes the
right of setoff in reorganization cases,109 it qualifies that right by providing that a petition filed "by or against a debtor eligible for relief
under [the reorganization] chapter shall operate as a stay of the setoff
of any obligation to the debtor against any claim owing by the
debtor ...." 110 Thus, the new Act codifies the trustee's typical practice in section 77 and chapter X reorganizations of obtaining an
injunction against setoffs at the time of the filing of the petition.m
However, if a hearing is brought by creditors, the burden of showing
that the stay of setoffs is an appropriate exercise of the court's power
is on the trustee or the debtor in possession.112 This burden can be
met only by demonstrating that the person asserting the right of
setoff is adequately protected.113
Interestingly, the proposed chapter contains the "fair and equitable" language currently found in section 77 and chapter X.114 Since
the new Act also expressly allows setoffs, it is apparently inconsistent
with the majority holding in Baker, which found the "fair and ~quitable" language of section 77 to bar setoffs except in "exceptional
circumstances."115 Unless the "fair and equitable" language of the
new Act can be distinguished from the same language in section ;'1;7,
the Baker Court's interpretation of that language will be open to
question if the Act is passed.116 It is possible, however, that the Baker
rule will survive. The argument that setoffs can seriously impair cash
flow and thus hinder the revitalization of an organization whose existence is crucial to the public welfare would retain its ·significance
under the proposed Act. Furthermore, Justice Douglas asserted in a
footnote in Baker that "[i]n a straight bankruptcy case, ... the Court
construed § 68 as 'permissive rather than mandatory' and as to which
the bankruptcy court 'exercises its discretion ... upon the general
108. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) • [hereinafter Proposed Bankruptcy Act].
109. "The allowable claim ,of a creditor shall be set off against a mutual debt
owed to the debtor by the creditor except to the extent that (I) the allowable claim
was transferred to one asserting the right of setoff after the date of the petition, or
(2) the allowable claim was transferred to one asserting the right of setoff within
three months before the date of the petition at a time when the debtor was insolvent.
For the purposes of this subdivision, the debtor js presumed to have been insolvent
during the three months prior to the date of the petition." Proposed Bankruptcy
Act § 5-20l(a).
110. Proposed Bankruptcy Act § 7-204(a).
111. Proposed Bankruptcy Act § 7-204, Comment 1.
112. Proposed Bankruptcy Act § 7-204(b).
113. Proposed Bankruptcy Act § 7-204(b).
114. Proposed Bankruptcy Act § 7-310(d)(2)(B).
115. See text at notes 35-36 supra.
116. The new act would relax the requirement of the "fair and equitable" standard
as presently applied by the courts, however. REPORT, supra note 54, § 7-310, Note, at
254.
'
.
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principles of equity.'"117 The footnote implies that, even when setoffs are explicitly allowed by statute, they may be denied if the equities of the particular situation so warrant. Under this interpretation,
Baker could continue to stand for the proposition that setoffs should
3s
be allowed only in "exceptional circumstances."" 1

117. 417 U.S. at 470 n., citing Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt & Co., 237
US. 447 (1915).
118. It could be argued that, since the new Act states that "[t]he allowable claim
of a creditor shall be setoff against a mutual debt ... " (emphasis added), see note 109
supra, courts would have no remaining equitable discretion to deny setoffs. However,

the language of section 68a of the current Act, 11 U.S.C. § 108(a), also states that "one
debt shall be setoff against the other . . ." (emphasis added), and the Supreme Court
has held this language is "permissive rather than mandatory." See text at note 64 supra.
The effect of Baker may also be felt with respect to section 7-204 of the Proposed
Act, which provides that the debtor's petition acts as a stay of all setoffs, provided
that the trustee proves "that the person asserting the right of setoff is adequately
protected." Baker indicates that setoffs are disfavored in the reorganization context,
and the case may prompt courts to give a liberal reading to the term "adequately
protected" so that stays of setoffs may be routinely granted.

